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For my family and the thousands of Mayan people affected by the war,
May the pain and suffering you endured be remembered
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There is no doubt that [the Nazi Holocaust] is... the greatest and most horrible
single crime ever committed in the whole history of the world.
- Winston S. Churchill (1944)1
Even though the Genocide Convention of 1948, created by the General Assembly of the
United Nations to prevent future genocides after World War II, was convened to prevent this
horrific crime from taking place in the future, genocide has been a reoccurring crime in our
global community, famous examples being Rwanda, Armenia and Yugoslavia.2 More than 50
million people have fallen victim to genocide in the twentieth century alone. 3 Another lesser
known example of genocide, what is sometimes referred to as the “Silent Holocaust,” took place
in the countryside of Guatemala between 1978 and 1983. Under the reign of General Efraín Ríos
Montt, the bloodiest period in Guatemala’s history was commanded from March 1982 to August
1983.4
During Ríos Montt’s 17-month presidency, his armies wiped out large portions of the
Mayan population: an estimated 70,000 were killed or disappeared under his counterinsurgency
campaigns, which systematically attacked 626 villages. 5 More than 30 years later, Ríos Montt’s
victims are finally beginning to see justice. In May 2013, Ríos Montt was sentenced to 80 years
in prison in Guatemalan court by a three-judge panel for crimes against humanity and intent to
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eliminate the Ixil ethnic group.6 After hearing from more than 100 witnesses, including
psychologists, military experts and Indian survivors, Judge Yasmín Barrios claimed, “we are
completely convinced of [his] intent to destroy the Ixil ethnic group.”7 Even more, Adama
Diend, the United Nations special adviser on the prevention of genocide, said this case could
serve as an example to other countries that have failed to hold individuals responsible for human
rights violations accountable.8 It seemed Ríos Montt would finally pay for his crimes;
nevertheless, only 10 days later the Constitutional Court overturned the verdict on a technicality,
and the case will now resume in January 2015.9
Although the case is still ongoing, Ríos Montt’s crimes against the Indigenous people of
Guatemala have been brought to our global community’s attention. The Guatemala genocide case
emerged during a 30-year civil war in Guatemala that took place between 1966-1996, in which
over 200,000 Guatemalans were killed or disappeared.10 What began as a war between the
Guatemalan government and leftist guerrilla movements escalated into a bloodshed against noncombatants, claimed to be “insurgency” forces in support of the guerrilla groups. According to
the UN-sponsored Commission on Historical Clarification (CEH), the Guatemalan military
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targeted students, professors, indigenous communities, clergy and labor leaders under the
premise that they formed a subversive internal enemy.11 Ríos Montt oversaw counterinsurgency
forces launch a systematic campaign of genocide against the Mayan people by implementing his
scorched-earth policy and “beans and rifles” campaign. As stated by the Center of Justice and
Accountability’s (CJA) case summary,
the army and its paramilitary teams - including “civil patrons” of forcibly
conscripted local men - attacked Mayan villages. Concentrating in the Quiché
Department, the armed forces would cordon off a village, round up the
inhabitants, separate men from women and kill them sequentially... Extreme
torture mutilation and sexual violence became commonplace, as was violence
against children. This two-year period became known as the “Silent Holocaust.”12
My paper will focus on how Ríos Montt was able to commit these crimes, and walk away
unscathed for 30 years. What were his intentions and goals during his presidency? How much
did the Reagan Administration know about Ríos Montt when he was an American ally? Even
more, how did citizens of Guatemala and citizens of the world stay in denial of the crime’s
existence for so long?
Because this armed conflict took place in the early 1980s, and was kept quiet by the
Guatemalan government, little has been researched in terms of the events as a genocide. In terms
of attacking non-combatants, the civil war first caught international attention after Rigoberta
Menchú’s autobiography, I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, was released in
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1984 (first in Spanish, and then translated into English among other languages).13 Her work
became more popular when she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for her contributions
to the protection of Guatemala’s indigenous people. She went on to join a group of Spanish and
Guatemalan non-governmental organizations to file a suit in the Spanish National Court against
eight senior Guatemalan government officials for genocide, terrorism and systematic torture.14 It
was not until 2005 when the Guatemalan Supreme Court gave the Spanish Courts jurisdiction
over crimes of international importance prescribed by international treaties, including the Geneva
Conventions.15 CJA officially joined the case in 2006, and Judge Pedraz issued international
arrest warrants for the eight defendants named in the case, including Ríos Montt. The
investigation opened four rounds of testimonies and evidence contained in thousands of
declassified U.S. documents that relate to the civil war.16
Besides Rigoberta Menchú and the NGOs referred to above, few scholars have focused
on Ríos Montt’s presidency; most of the research on the topic discusses Central America’s
human rights violations as a whole during the Cold War, or Guatemala’s 30-year civil war as a
whole. Moreover, most scholars in this field focused on the revolution in Nicaragua, which also
13
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took place in the 1980s. Victoria Sanford is one of the few American scholars thus far who has
focused her work on the human rights violations in Guatemala as a genocide. Professor Sanford
received her Ph.D. in Anthropology from Stanford University where she also received training in
International Human Rights Law and Immigration Law at Stanford Law School. She has worked
with Central American refugees since 1986, and as a human rights activist and scholar, Sanford
has focused her extensive field research with Maya communities in Guatemala.17 Sanford wrote
Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala, in which she includes more than 400
testimonies from massacre survivors, military officers and government officials. She focuses on
the experiences of Maya survivors and how they rebuild their lives. Moreover, Sanford is a coauthor to the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundations’s report to the Commission for
Historical Clarification.18 Because Ríos Montt’s case has become well known since his trial, we
can expect more research to surface in the next decade.
My topic is important because little research has been done concerning the specific time
period between 1982 and 1983. I will focus on how Ríos Montt committed these acts of
genocide. I will even assert that the Reagan Administration was aware of the massacres
occurring in Guatemala, and even provided military training and financial aid to Guatemala’s
government during its civil war. I will cover Guatemala’s rich history of racism and class
discrimination, and how and why military regimes were set in motion from the 1960s to the
1990s, prompting Guatemala’s 30-year civil war. I will discuss Ríos Montt’s crimes by utilizing
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Indians’ firsthand accounts, documentaries and other primary sources. I will also include
personal interviews with my family from Guatemala. Lastly, I will focus on the definition of
genocide and how this newly coined crime is so difficult to prove guilty, especially in the case of
Ríos Montt. Were his crimes really acts of genocide? Why did it take so long to build his case?
How do the people of Guatemala feel about Montt, especially since he was technically found
guilty in May? Because I will be utilizing personal interviews with family members that lived in
Guatemala City during the 1980s, my paper will be unique in that I can include my own family
history. Moreover, many of the CIA documents, newspaper articles, etc. that I will be using have
surfaced in the last decade, the last year even; therefore, certain aspects of my topic have barely
been investigated. The “Silent Holocaust” is a complicated event; this paper will attempt to
examine Ríos Montt and his crimes from multiple points of view.

Historical Context
Before we can comprehend the events that occurred under Ríos Montt, we must
understand the foundation of racism and class discrimination upon the Mayan people that
remained an underlying part of Guatemalan culture. Contemporary Guatemala is 42,000 square
miles, comprised of 9.5 million people, of which 5 million are of indigenous Mayan ancestry.19
Since pre-colonization, the indigenous communities have been centered in the mountainous
northwestern part of the country, known as the highlands. Even today, Guatemala is “figuratively,
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geographically, and ethnically constructed as Indian West and Ladino East.”20 This geographical
distinction continues to predict cultural, political, and economic processes in Guatemala. 21
In 1523 Cortés’ second-in-command, Pedro de Alvarado, led the expedition to Central
America and established Guatemala as a Spanish kingdom.22 They burned Maya cities, and
oppressed and executed their people. Nearly thirty-eight percent of Guatemala’s indigenous
population died as a consequence of their conquest and disease.23 The colonial class system was
made up of Peninsulares, Creoles, Ladinos and Indigenous people. As serfs or slaves, the
indigenous people were considered the lowest social class, denied political and economical
influence, and inhumanely exploited on their own land. 24 Even when Guatemala gained
independence from Spain in 1821, endemic racism and discrimination ensued. Since the first
Spanish expedition, the indigenous people have been degraded and segregated from the rest of
society.
Guatemala’s independence had little significance for the indigenous population.
Guatemala alternated between Liberal and Conservative rule until 1871 when the Liberals took
control of the nation. During the cycles of Liberal regimes, dictators aimed to accelerate
capitalist transition to compete with the world market coffee boom. They confiscated Indian
communal lands and exploited their labor, and plantation owners were guaranteed Maya workers
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because the state wanted export agriculture growth.25 In addition, as the world acquired a taste
for coffee, foreign - particularly U.S. - interest increased within Guatemala, which would later
influence Guatemala’s political situation far more than could have been predicted.
The Guatemalan Revolution of October 1944 represents a short-lived beacon of hope for
the Mayans. Jorge Ubico’s dictatorship (1931-1944) was replaced by the liberal presidency of
Juan José Arévalo Bermejo (1945-1951) and then the democratically elected government of
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951-1954). 26 President Juan Jose Arévalo sought to transition from the
political and social paternalism of a plantation-based economy to a social and labor legislation,
nurtured by industrialization and export-oriented agriculture. He opposed labor extortion,
dictatorial rule, and racism. 27 Arbenz granted new voting rights to illiterates, set up schools, and
built roads in some highland communities. In June of 1952, he instated the Law of Agrarian
Reform, outlawing debt peonage and regulating land rents. Radically, Arbenz provided plantation
lands to be redistributed to campesinos28 through local agrarian committees. On the accusations
that Arbenz was a Communist, the U.S. orchestrated Operation PBSuccess, in which a CIAsponsored military coup overthrew Arbenz in 1954 by spreading propaganda and false
information about Arbenz all over the country.29 This covert invasion fueled anticommunist
elements within Guatemalan politics, yet now it is clear that PBSuccess had its ulterior motives.

25

Betsy Konefal, Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala, 1960-1990 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2010), 16.
26

Martha K. Huggins, Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 79.
27

Director of Intelligence, “Guatemala: Prospects for Political Moderation,” August 1983, www2.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc26.pdf, accessed February 2014.
28
29

Latin-American Indian farmer or farm laborer.

Nicholas Cullather, “Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954” (Washington D.C:
Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994).

11

The United Fruit Company, Guatemala’s number one land owner, was owned by John Foster
Dulles, brother of CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, and the Law of Agrarian Reform threatened to
redistribute some of its land.
The US coup against Arbenz led to interlocking cycles of right-wing dictatorships and
guerrilla activity that became a culture of state terror, starting with the installation of Colonel
Carlos Castillo Armas by the United States. Within weeks of the coup, the new Guatemalan
government suspended the National Indigenista Institute.30 By 1956, the first death squads were
in operation.31 It was clear that any freedom for the indigenous people brought upon by the
Revolution was over. Furthermore, given the United States’ military assistance and training, the
Guatemala military became a direct product of the U.S.
The first state of the insurgency began in the early 1960s after a nationalist uprising by
military officers, marking the beginning of a repressive and violent conflict at the hands of seven
military dictatorships. Memories of the Arevalo-Arbenz period instilled deep suspicions of
anything left of center within the political right, and the Guatemala government became
responsible for the murders and “disappearances” of thousands of intellectuals and opposition
leaders on the premise that all communists would be punished.32 Political organizations that
attracted the support of intellectuals and young professionals were barred from the ballot or
intimidated by repression, and the thousands of demonstrators who protested electoral fraud were
shutdown by the government. Furthermore, political awareness among lower classes of society
made these classes less responsive to the economic elite, and the cultural and racial differences
30
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between Indians and non-Indians formed opposition against united political action.33 Angered by
social repression and Guatemala’s economic decline, armed guerrilla groups emerged through
the 1960s and 70s to challenge the dictatorships’ leadership.34 Indians were recruited by the
guerrilla groups, and as the war continued they questioned their poverty and segregation from
society, unable to leave their farmland lives.35 In response, the ideology of anticommunism
expanded to include all subversives as the enemy, and eventually it seemed that preventing
communism was just an excuse used by the government to justify their quest for complete
political power. By 1978 (when Lucas García was installed), the struggle between these guerrilla
forces and the government led to an absolutely brutal response, including the slaughter of
civilians, especially between 1978 and 1982.36
The civil war’s state terror has roots in both colonial power and Guatemalan
independence. As Daniel Goldhagen says, genocide is a plausible crime because it is deeply
embedded within the cultural archetypes of a society.37 Although the colonial class system is no
longer intact, the discrimination and racism it encouraged was still very prominent during the
civil war, and even in today’s time. Moreover, Mayan communities are separated from the rest of
Guatemala because of their differing culture, and physically separated from most of Guatemala’s
population because the majority are located throughout the highlands and rural areas of
Guatemala. It is racism and the Mayas’ geographical location, combined with the struggle to
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maintain power over Guatemala’s indigenous population and the guerrilla groups, that led to a
scorched-earth campaign under the reign of Ríos Montt that took place in the Mayan
communities.

Background Prevalent to Ríos Mont’s Presidency
Prior to General José Efraín Ríos Montt’s presidency, the citizens of Guatemala held his
morals to reputable standards. On March 23, 1982, Ríos Montt was installed as head of the
military and president of Guatemala by the military coup. Among assuming power, Ríos Montt
claimed he would end indiscriminate killings by government forces. In fact, according to a report
by the Department of State, Ríos was expected to persuade the military to respect human rights,
but still lead a fight against insurgents.38 Before taking power, Ríos Montt said his primary goal
was to bring the insurgency under control and gain the support of Indians.39 However, as we
know now, human rights abuses did continue. In fact they increased, escalating to acts of
genocide and human rights violations that would take over 20 years to persecute in the court of
law. Between 1982 and 1983, the Maya people were identified as the internal enemy under the
assumption that they constituted a base of support for the guerrillas. Under the reign of Ríos
Montt, the state of Guatemala systematically committed acts of extreme brutality, including
torture, rape and other inhumane actions to terrorize the Maya population.40 Moreover, the state
destroyed the basic elements of social cohesion between Maya members, especially when they
38
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were forced to witness or commit these acts themselves. 41 Ríos Montt’s policies allowed him to
commit scorched earth operations that systematically attacked 626 villages and affected
thousands of people’s lives.42
Ríos Montt has a long military background that began long before his coup of 1982. His
military education began with four years at the Guatemalan Military Academy and
counterinsurgency training at Fort Bragg in North Carolina in 1961. Throughout the decades he
rose through the ranks of the Guatemalan army.43 After three months in the United States, where
he was serving as director of the school run by the Church of the Complete Word, a Gospel
Outreach Church of Eureka, California, he returned to Guatemala with political aspirations and
ran as the Christian Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in 1974. Although he lost this
election, he remained a born-again Christian in the eyes of Guatemala’s citizens, and was
supported by evangelical Christians. He was deemed virtuous in the evangelical church, and
even gained a reputation for honesty because of his defeat in the 1974 elections, which had been
blatantly rigged by ballot fraud.44 My Aunt Ligia was friends with Ríos Montt’s son. In a
personal interview, she told me that she visited his house on several occasions. She said, “Ríos
Montt never seemed like the man he is judged to be now.”45 She believes, “religion and military
power convinced him he was doing the right thing. But he is at fault. He needs to pay for the
41
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crimes he committed.”46 In another interview with my family friend, Celeste Curley, Curley
recalls the day Ríos Montt became president. She remembers feeling happy because of the fraud
of the elections in that time, but speculates that his religion turned him into a “fanatically sick
person.”47 She said, “he was really crazy. The skate place turned into a church. The disco turned
into a church. Everywhere the “devil was” he turned it into a church.”48 Although at the time,
many Guatemalan citizens, such as my family, did not know the repercussions that would come
from Ríos Montt’s presidency, he was perceived as a strange, religious man. Eventually Ríos
Montt was placed as president, succeeding Romeo Lucas García in 1982.
Fernando Romeo Lucas García led a mass opposition movement against guerilla forces
that ended in the assassination of 5,000 individuals. 49 Another military man, Lucas García rose
steadily in the military for years until he won the presidential election in 1978. He was an
unpopular president. Each person I interviewed referred to Lucas García as “stupid.” Curley said,
“Lucas Garcia was another military man who was famous of being dumb and stupid, as he had
no education or instruction.”50 During his four-year reign, Lucas García and his repressive tactics
led to human rights violations, such as the indiscriminate killing of Indian peasants.51 The war
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escalated after the burning of the Spanish Embassy in 1981; Guatemalan forces raided the
embassy, in which a fire broke out and killed 36 people.52
Vicente Menchú, an activist in the Committee of the Peasant Union (CUC), a committee
that worked to secure basic rights for the Mayan people, led a group of activists to Guatemala
City to protest the violence in the highlands. 53 On January 31st, 1981, twenty-seven of the
activists, mostly Maya members of the CUC, occupied the Spanish embassy. Guatemalan
security forces reacted by firebombing the embassy.54 Even though the fire was caused by the
Guatemalan security forces, many civilians thought otherwise, such as my mom who said, “when
[the CUC] took the embassy, they felt they had no way out and committed suicide by throwing a
Molotov bomb.”55 Moreover, according to testimonies received by the Commission for
Historical Clarification (CEH), the national police made no attempt to assist the people inside. 37
people died that day. Even the sole CUC activist who survived the fire, Gregorio Yujá Xona, was
taken to a hospital, and while being “guarded” by the national police, he was kidnapped, tortured
and killed.56 My Aunt Alma tole me how she perceived the burning of the embassy,
The secretary to the Ambassador was my friend and the niece of the former vice
president, Caceres Lenhoff, was my dear friend from school. Both burned during
the taking of the embassy. I remember that those years the ambience was very
somber. The indigenas were up in arms fighting against the government who were
stealing their land and killing them under the umbrella that they were
communists. They were only people trying to take back what was taken from
52
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them so violently. When I first moved to California, I went to the library in
Thousand Oaks, and found a book in regards to this issue that had been prohibited
in Guatemala. According to the book, the indigenas asked Caceres Lenhoff and
Molina Orantes for help. They then asked the ambassador of Spain to intercede
with Lucas Garcia for a peaceful resolution. The president instead told Chupina
Barahona, head of the police, and Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz, Minister of Interior, to
kill the indigenas. They locked the embassy and set [it] on fire with Molotov
incendiary bombs. They all burned. A very sad and shameful part of our history. 57
After Lucas García’s presidency, the Attorney General’s office in Guatemala asked courts
to open a trial against him on charges of extortion and fraud; he was convicted for extortion. 58
Recently, genocide charges were filed against him in 1999, and a warrant for his arrest for the
burning of the embassy in Guatemala finally went through in 2005; however, by this time Lucas
García became terminally ill and was deemed not fit to testify. He died in Venezuela where he
lived since his exile.59
Ríos Montt from 1982-1983
During Lucas Garcia and Ríos Montt’s presidencies, the appearance of an insurgency
problem reinforced the role of the armed forces, and the role of armed forces only angered the
insurgent groups, escalating the violence further and further until it reached acts of genocide. The
four left-wing guerilla groups - the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary
Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan
Labor Party (PGT) - gained more popularity, and combined to form the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982.60 The government became obsessed with the connection
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between the Mayans, who supported the guerrilla groups, and the URNG itself. Ríos Montt and
his army perceived all Mayans as natural allies of the insurrection, and thus as enemies of the
state.61 Lucas Garcia was ousted for not effectively stopping the subversive groups, so the
military coup installed Ríos Montt.
Guatemalan military dictatorships waged terror campaigns to manipulate public policy,
and committed brutal crimes in order to command obedience to its authority. Ríos Montt was no
different. Immediately after gaining power, he established a three-member military junta.62 The
junta suspended the 1965 Constitution and dissolved Congress, adopting the “Fundamental
Government Statue,” which declared that the military would take over the responsibilities of the
executive branch and legislature.63 This expansion of jurisdiction helped create the infrastructure
necessary to carry out scorched earth operations. Ríos Montt set up Guatemala’s government in a
manner that gave him the power to do anything he wanted without facing lawful consequences
by the time he launched his counterinsurgency and military campaigns. With the National Plan of
Security and Development (PNSD), he created the legal framework to dissolve congress,
suspend political parties and cancelled the electoral law.64 Ríos Montt also extended the death
penalty to a number of crimes once punished with prison terms, including treason. 65 By 1982, the
situation was chaotic; between 400 and 500 people were killed monthly in politically related
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violence.66 Like his predecessor, Ríos Montt continued a war against insurgents that led to the
death of thousands of indigenous people.
Once denounced by Guerrilla forces, his first priority was to defeat the guerrillas with
military action, economic reforms, and, as he called it, “rifles and beans.” This basically meant,
as quoted in the New York Times of July 18, 1982 when Ríos Mont told an audience of
indigenous Guatemalans, “If you are with us, we’ll feed you; if not, we’ll kill you.”67 The Plan
de Sánchez Massacre occurred on the same day, which will be later discussed when examining
Maya survivor testimonies and the work of Victoria Sanford.
On December 7, 1982, Army Special Forces, known as kaibiles, committed a massacre at
Dos Erres in Petén. Ordered by Montt and operated by Orantes Sosa, they wiped out the entire
village, under the allegation that the non-combatants were guerrilla sympathizers, even though
they never discovered guerrilla troops. As documented by the Commission of Historical
Clarification in their 1999 report,
Minors were executed with blows from a sledgehammer, while the smallest ones
were smashed against walls or trees. Some of the specialists raped young girls.
Then the Kaibiles for two days killed most of the men and women with
sledgehammers and firearms and threw their bodies into the well. The few left
alive were held in the churches and the school. On the nights of December 7 and
8, the men who were still alive were taken to the mountain, where their throats
were slit, killing the last of the inhabitants, except for one boy who had hid in the
bushes and managed to save himself.68
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252 civilians were massacred even though no communist propaganda was found in the village. 69
They then killed other villagers for a three-day period during Operation Brushcutter on their
return to their base of operations.70 Hundreds of innocent people were brutally murdered, all
justified as a retaliation to a guerrilla ambush, in which only 21 (armed) soldiers were killed.
The army’s inability to eliminate the guerrillas definitively led to Victoria 82 issued on
June 16, 1982 (Plan de Campaña), which was designed to restructure, strengthen and coordinate
the military’s forces. According to Victoria 82, “the population’s mentality [was] the principal
objective.”71 This was the plan where army’s strategists planned the scorched earth operations
that would annihilate Mayan regions in the following months because they sought total
elimination of the subversive groups. A report written by the U.S Department of Defense
explained that the army...
...intended to act with two sets of rules, one to protect and respect the rights of
average citizens who lived in secure areas (mostly in the cities)... and the second
set of rules would be applied to the areas where subversion was prevalent. In
these areas (‘war zones’) the rules of unconventional warfare would apply...
Guerrilla would be destroyed by fire and their infrastructure eradicated by social
welfare programs.72
These rural areas are mostly inhabited by Indigenous people; it is evident that their communities
were fatally intertwined with the insurgency.
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Ríos Montt was also responsible for instituting the Civil Defense Patrols throughout the
Mayan highlands. Most of these 1.3 million people who were ordered to patrol other indigenous
communities were predominantly indigenous. This in turn weakened their own cultural
identities.73 This is just one example of how Ríos Montt attacked the Mayan culture and forced
their political participation. It is evident that under the reign of Ríos Montt plans such as
Operation Ixil and Operation Firmeza 83 were successfully executed. In just 1983, his forces
“carried out 82 massacres, causing almost 1,000 deaths and disappearances.”74
On August 8, 1983, Ríos Montt was replaced by his Minister of Defense, General Óscar
Humberto Mejía Victores, who said that “religious fanatics” were abusing their positions in
government.75 Seven people were killed in the coup, but Ríos Montt survived and later founded
the Guatemalan Republic Front. He was elected President of Congress in 1995 and 2000. 76
The UN-sponsored truth commission, the CEH, established in 1994, and its final report
(1999) “Memory of Silence,” established that the
army was responsible for 86 percent of extrajudicial executions during the
internal armed confrontation. The Patrullas de Autodensa Civil (Civil Defense
Patrols, PAC) were responsible for 21 percent, military commissioners for 11
percent, and other security forces- National Police, Guardia de hacienda and
others- for 4 percent. 77
The CEH concluded that the state committed “acts of genocide” against the Mayan population,
describing the “scorched earth” strategy and massacres of rural and indigenous populations Ríos
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Montt used. In almost all of these cases, the army’s objective was to kill the maximum possible
members of the groups, and that these acts corresponded with the intention to physically and
spiritually destroy the Maya groups. 78 This goes against Article II, subsection “b” of the Geneva
convention.79 These findings will be analyzed as we further investigate how Ríos Montt ordered
massacres that reflect high-level, premeditated policies that were in fact acts of genocide.
Ríos Montt entered his presidency as a respected and popular leader. The citizens of
Guatemala expected great things from Ríos Montt; he even stated in his inaugural address that
his presidency resulted from the will of God.80 And he continuously called himself a man of God,
even on his weekly Sunday “Sermonette” on the radio and TV, in which he urged Guatemalans to
substitute violence with love. 81 However, as we have examined through his actual acts, he led the
bloodiest period in Guatemala history, resulting in about 200,000 deaths, forced disappearances,
torture of noncombatants, and a vast amount of human rights violations.

U.S. Foreign Policy in Guatemala
The United States invested a lot of time and money into Guatemala and the rest of Latin
America throughout the twentieth century. The United States government supported Guatemala,
so long as Guatemala openly supported the anticommunist paradigm the U.S presented after the
coup of 1954. A lot of controversy surrounds the coup and its true intentions. Did the U.S. really
believe Arbenz was a communist? How did Arbenz’ economic reforms affect the United States
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capital investments (i.e. the United Fruit Company)? While we can never know for certain
whether Arbenz was truly a communist, we do know that the CIA spread fake propaganda to
make sure Guatemala believed he was. And by overthrowing Arbenz, the United States was able
to force their ideas of leadership upon Guatemala.
In the early twentieth century, the United States increased internal security by
establishing a police force in Latin America with primary loyalty to the United States. (Also, it is
important to address that other countries trained police in Latin America during the first decades
of the twentieth century, such as France and Germany.)82 After World War II, Washington
expanded international security by forming the National Security Council and the CIA in 1947,
both of which invested a lot of time into Guatemalan affairs. Moreover, their ideological
centerpiece for the Cold War did influence this idea of preventing the loss of “free” countries to
“communism” by training these countries’ security forces.83 The U.S. argued military training
and aid could prevent subversion before it could develop. After the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy
administration expanded U.S. training of foreign police. Under Kennedy, Latin America had the
largest number of police training programs, and as priorly mentioned, Ríos Montt trained under
the counterinsurgency training program in 1961.84
In 1974, Congress had to ban training foreign police when mounting evidence of torture,
disappearances, and killing by U.S-trained police emerged, and Congress could no longer ignore
the systematic violations of human rights by these forces. 85 Their training did not prevent armed
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conflict; subversion forces still fought for what they justified as political and economical
freedom, and these training programs made the U.S. complicit in the repression that followed.
During the Reagan Administration, U.S. support for Guatemala’s army only increased,
and even though police and military training was banned, Reagan found other ways to support
Guatemala and other right-wing governments in Latin America.86 After a meeting in Honduras
on December 4, 1982, President Reagan claimed Ríos Montt was “a man of great personal
integrity and commitment,” even calling him a democratic leader.87 Reagan even famously
complained to a reporter that Ríos Montt, the focus of criticism from human rights groups, was
getting a “bum rap.”88 Keep in mind, this meeting occurred months after Montt had taken office
and was already committing human violations crimes. Nevertheless, as an avowed
fundamentalist Christian with prior experience and training in the United States, Ríos Montt
impressed the Reagan administration and gained the United States’ support in the “fight against
communism.”
Even though the U.S. embassy heard of accounts of Indian massacre, the embassy
dismissed the reports as a communist inspired “disinformation campaign.”89 However, a CIA
secret cable sent in February 1982 reports the increase of “suspect right-wing violence” focusing
on the increasing number of kidnappings of students and educators. Bodies appearing in ditches
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is addressed.90 At the end of the document, Ambassador Frederic Chapin is “firmly convinced”
that the recent upsurge in violence is ordered and directed by “armed services officers close to
President Ríos Montt.”91 Clearly, U.S. government officials had an idea of the crimes taking
place under Ríos Montt.
The U.S.-operated School of the Americas provided military training for Latin America in
order to insure primary loyalty, with their own political agenda. As Huggins explains, “training
one country’s police by another is carried out within an unequal international distribution of
power: The recipient country always holds a subordinate position relative to the training
nation.”92 While the schools were justified as a means to prevent subversive groups,
professionalizing these dictators and providing them with more sophisticated arms and
equipment did not democratize or humanize their practices. Therefore, it is possible to pursue the
hypothesis that U.S. training of Latin American police was never meant to make them more
democratic, but to increase U.S. control over these countries. 93
Despite the ban on military aid enacted by the Carter administration, Reagan continued to
supply munitions and financial aid to Guatemala’s government. Economic aid went from $11
million in 1980 to $104 million in 1986.94 One example of the military aid was an export license
for jeeps and trucks valued at $3.1 million for the Guatemalan army. To do so the State
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Department removed “military vehicles” from a restricted list that bars the sale of such
equipment to countries considered violators of human rights under the Foreign Assistance Act. 95
Just three weeks after the CEH Report was released, in March of 1999, on a trip to
Guatemala, Clinton acknowledged responsibility for U.S. actions and “complicity with human
rights crimes in Guatemala over the previous forty years.” Clinton stated,
For the United States it is important that I state clearly that support for military
forces or intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression of
the kind described in the [Truth Commission] report was wrong, and the United
States must not repeat that mistake. We must, and we will, instead, continue to
support the peace and reconciliation process in Guatemala. 96
President Clinton’s apology affirms that the United States’ economic and military aid in
Guatemala helped Ríos Montt and his political and economic endeavors. This should lead us to
question the motivations for assisting a man responsible for large massacres. Moreover, the
United States’ blatant attempt to manipulate Latin America’s state economies, their covert
operations to overthrow Arbenz back in 1954, and their influential military aid illustrate how the
United States indirectly assisted these criminal acts.

Testimonies of the Mayan People: Victims Speak out about Human Rights Violations
The testimonies of Ríos Montt’s victims have helped us understand the hardships these
Mayan people endured. According to Victoria Sanford, testimonies raise a number of issues
about the limits of memory, and although we must accept that memory becomes increasingly
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unreliable as time passes, it is also important to value testimonies as substantial first-hand
material for the reconstruction of truth for such controversial events. 97 Not only did Maya
testimonies help the CEH and other investigations determine that there were acts of genocide in
Guatemala, they also gave hope to and a sense of peace to the survivors. In this section, we will
discuss several victims’ stories and how their lives have been displaced by this horrific time
period, beginning with Rigoberta Menchú and her story that has touched millions of people
through her 1984 autobiography, I, Rigoberta Menchú.
With the help of anthropologist Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, Menchú tells the story of her
village and their life on the fincas,98 their affiliation with guerrilla groups, and the murder of her
brother, father and mother. Her beginning chapters explain the racism and class discrimination
that took place on the fincas. Despite the unfair discrimination on the fincas and in the cities, at
first Menchú and her family disassociate with Guatemalan politics and policies, primarily
identifying with their Mayan culture. However, they eventually joined the guerrilla movement in
the mid-1970s because of the unescapable violence and their economic struggles. Menchú
addresses how her family was too poor to eat, and too poor to buy essential medication or other
life necessities. Although in theory, political participation was voluntary, many Guatemalans had
no choice but to join either the PACs or the guerrillas. While many Mayans did not join a party,
others like Menchú felt obligated fight for basic rights. Some were even recruited from a young
age. My Aunt Ligia recalls, “[Violence] has been provoked by both the guerillas and the army.
They had to force indigenous males to enter the army, which I witnessed. They arrived in trucks

97

Hinton and O’Neill, Genocide, 33.

98 A rural

property, ranch, or farm in Spain or Spanish America.

28

and took them. Mothers and wives and children were crying.”99 My Aunt Ligia worked as a
doctor in various Mayan villages throughout the war, which is why she witnessed these methods
of recruitment.
Menchú’s story becomes increasingly heartbreaking as her family was torn apart by the
violence of the 1970-80s. Her brother was tortured and killed in late 1979, and she lost her father
in the burning of the Spanish Embassy of 1981. Then less than three months later, her mother
was captured, raped, and killed. In Menchú’s autobiography, she goes into detail about the deaths
of her family and neighbors, and the hardships Mayans faced during the civil war.
Controversy about her narrative emerged when anthropologist David Stoll protested in
1998 that Menchú misrepresented certain events for her own political agenda. 100 Surely, her
account does seem to have added credibility to the guerrillas’ representation of Maya struggle for
justice. Moreover, Arias and Stoll learned she did not witness her mother’s torture and death like
claimed in her autobiography, but was told about it by her community members, meaning it was
not an eyewitness testimony. Arias and Stoll claim that she dramatized her life events.101 Despite
these fabrications, her story is true in terms of the events that took place, the methods of torture
and death, the economic situation of many Mayas in the fincas, etc., even if her story should not
taken as literally as the eyewitness accounts that will be discussed below. The point of studying
her work is to understand how her story helped attract world awareness of the traumatic events
that occurred in the highlands of Guatemala.
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Menchú returned to Guatemala in 1986 (after fleeing to Mexico) and became a national
icon. Her story helped other survivors come forward with their stories, which is why she won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. Today, Rigoberta Menchú is a symbol of indigenous oppression and
racism. She transitioned from peripheral silence to which all Mayas have been condemned by
racism to a prominent role as a national leader. Moreover, her contributions to the initial suit in
the Spanish National Court against Guatemalan government officials, including Ríos Montt,
helped create a case of international importance that convicted several Guatemalan officials.
It is important to mention, that like Menchú, there were many Mayan activists guilty of
opposing the state. Some others set out to establish a moderate platform (neither right nor left).
An example of an indigenous political party is the National Integration Front (FIN), created in
1976, that sought to gain seats in Congress. However, FIN mistakenly sided with candidate
Lucas García, who claimed to be compassionate to the indigenous peoples’ situation.102 Later
during Lucas García’s reign, his name in Ixim became accompanied by the word assassin, and in
the end FIN leaders did suffer at the hands of the state.103 Apparently, Lucas García allowed FIN
to submit an application for party recognition so that its members could be easily found and
murdered.104
As previously addressed, many other Maya survivors reached out once the case reached
international awareness. The main scholar of the Guatemala genocide, Victoria Sanford, based
more than a decade of field research on the exhumations of cemeteries of Maya massacre
victims, and dedicated her studies to excavating individual and collective memories of the
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survivors as an act of community reconstruction.105 Sanford collected hundreds of testimonies,
such as Erazmo’s, a man who had lost his wife, eight children and his mother in the massacre. He
pointed to the open graves and said, “there, there is no lie. There you are seeing the truth.”106
And when asked why these events are still so important years after the massacre, Juan Manuel,
who had lost his family, said, “We want peace. We want people to know what happened here so
that it does not happen again - not here, not in some other village, department or country.”107
Sanford says that survivors come forward to unburden their pain and share their experiences in
hope that their testimonies will reach others in a rippling effect.108
In her essay, “What is an Anthropology of Genocide,” Sanford recounts an extraordinary
story of a repeated testimony in both her research, and anthropologist Ricardo Falla’s. Falla lived
with survivors of Guatemalan army massacres in the northern Ixcán region of Guatemala, and in
1992 published Massacres de la Selva based on 700 testimonies.109 Examples include a couple
and their 1-1/2-year-old baby girl who survived by throwing themselves into a river from a
bridge. The mother was carrying the infant and the woman was shot by a bullet from the bridge,
but she and the baby survived. Another example is an 8-year-old girl who survived the soldiers’
torture (they tied a rope around her neck and tightened it) because they thought she died and left
her. These testimonies alone have the potential to be exaggerated or limited by memory;
however, that same year Sanford completed a yearlong project of taping the life history of
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Mateo, a Maya child survivor of the Ixcán massacres, who gave a similar testimony regarding
the two survivor stories above, but he had never met Falla or read his work. 110 Mateo had been
recruited by the guerrillas, the civil patrols and the army before turning 15. When he met with
Sanford, he was a 19-year-old refugee attending high school in San Francisco. In Mateo’s story
he describes a narrative told by his father: The army arrived to the center close to his village. The
soldiers first burned the church with people inside. They captured about 10 families and put them
in a line to kill them. Mateo’s father’s friend was stabbed in the neck then thrown in a hole, but
survived. His daughter was then tortured with a rope around her neck then thrown in the hole
when they thought she was dead too. He continues by telling the story about a man and woman,
decided to run for the river. The army fired at them, but they reached the other side and survived.
The couple came to Mateo’s father’s house the next morning, and the old man came with his
daughter because he was the father’s friend.111
Guillermo Moralex Pérez spoke as a eyewitness for the Permanent People’s Tribunal held
in Madrid in January 1983 of the massacres in Bullaj, Tajumulco during Ríos Montt’s
presidency.112 His testimony was translated and published in English in 1984. He said, “[Ríos
Montt] announced he was going to be democratic, but how long did the democracy last? Only 20
days, no more. After 20 days, he began to massacre, kidnap, and torture, according to the
radio.”113 Pérez explains how the army invaded his village throughout the year of 1982 and killed
dozens of innocent community members. In one story that took place on November 24, 1982,
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Pérez recalls that the army “cut off the head and arms, and then cut open [Luisa Martín’s] chest
with a knife... and in this manner, they finished off all members of four families, 18 in all.” In his
testimony he talks about Ríos Montt’s “Beans and Guns” campaign and says, “There in our
village, we see very clearly what the army does- bombard, shoot, burn houses, kill people, and
destroy all the food supplied in the village. We have never seen this offer of beans that the news
speaks of.”114
In terms of finding the truth, especially in the court of law, collective memories help
establish accurate memories of events and help develop a genuine political process of
collectivity. One example is a testimony collected by a boy named Pablo. The army occupied his
his newly repopulated village of Plan de Sánchez in 1984. Two years earlier, the army had
massacred 188 people, and in 1984 they returned, even forcing the village’s men to participate as
patrollers for the army.115 In his testimony, Pablo refused to collaborate with the army, for he had
once been in the army, told he would be defending his patria, his family, his land, and in the end
his family was killed by the army. Pablo was only 16, but his brave refusal to consent to
cooperating with the army led to the village’s collective refusal to consent to the army.116 It is
shared memories like this one that give us multiple perspectives. Instead of just having Pablo’s
testimony, we have his entire village’s testimony; this helped the Commission for Historical
Clarification build a case against the Guatemalan state for carrying out a premeditated campaign
of violence against its own citizens.
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The testimonies of survivors and the forensic analysis of the remains of massacre victims
in Plan de Sánchez provided evidence for a petition filed by survivors with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in 1995, requesting that the commission pass the case on to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.117 While cases in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights can take up to ten years, finally on April 29, 2004, the Inter-American Court issued its
condemnation of the Guatemalan government for the July 18, 1982, massacre of 188 Achi-Maya
in the village of Plan de Sánchez. This was the first ruling by the Inter-American Court against
the Guatemala state for any of the 626 massacres carried out by the army in the early 1980s.118
This ruling is important because the following key points were included in the
judgement:
(1) there was a genocide in Guatemala; (2) this genocide was part of the framework of
the internal armed conflict when the armed forces of the Guatemalan government
implemented its National Security Doctrine in their counterinsurgency actions; and (3)
these counterinsurgency actions carried out within the Guatemalan government’s
National Security Doctrine took place during the regime of General Efraín Ríos
Montt...119
Since this case, the FAFG (Forensic Anthropology Foundation), an NGO based in Guatemala,
has carried out more than 200 exhumations of clandestine cemeteries of massacre victims in
Guatemala.
Novelist Tim O’Brien wrote in 1990, “in a true war story, if there’s a moral at all... it
comes down to gut instinct. A true war story, if truly told, makes the stomach believe.... a true
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war story is never about war.... it’s about love and memory. It’s about sorrow.”120 These painful
memories help survivors reconstruct their histories and communicate these events to outsiders. 121
As researchers, we must seek to extract the truth, but at the same time understand and respect the
memories shared with us.

Aftermath of the War and the Initial Case Against Ríos Montt
As part of the Peace Accords of 1996 that ended the civil war, the UN-Sponsored Truth
Commission (CEH) was established to investigate the human rights violations in Guatemala. The
CEH, headed by German human rights expert Dr Christian Tomuschat, released a twelve-volume
formal report called Guatemala: Memory of Silence on February 25, 1999. The report was
submitted to the Guatemalan people, the government of Guatemala, and the United Nations.122
The CEH used 9,000 testimonies from war victims and a very detailed, confidential
database to conclude that 200,000 people had been killed or disappeared during the war.123
Ninety-three percent of the 626 massacres “had been carried out by state security forces and
paramilitary groups linked to them;” the URNG was responsible for 3 percent and the remaining
4 percent remained unidentified. Eighty-three percent of the war’s victims were Maya. Some
examples of the database used to conclude the war’s outcomes are the National Security Archive
created by Kate Doyle, which presents Operation Sofia, 359 pages of documents, telegrams,
maps, and hand-written reports which documents secret military files on the counterinsurgency
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campaign that resulted in massacres of the Mayan civilians. It references the killing of unarmed
civilians, burning of homes, destruction of crops and aerial bombing of refugees trying to escape
the violence.124 Doyle also presented the Guatemalan military’s “death squad diary.” The military
kept detailed records of its death squad operations. The army log reveals the fate of the
Guatemalan citizens who had “disappeared” at the hands of security forces during the 1980s.
These victims included peasants, social and student leaders, professors, political leaders,
members of religious groups etc. Replete with photos of 183 victims and coded references to
their executions, the 54-page document was smuggled out of the Guatemalan army’s intelligence
files and provided to human rights advocates in February, just two days before the CEH released
Memoria.125
The truth commission investigated human rights abuses and formulated recommendations
that would assist in Guatemala’s healing process; however, “as a consequence of intense military
pressure, the commission was denied powers of prosecution and was forbidden to publish the
names of accused violators.”126 Even though the CEH was not allowed to publish offenders’
names or prosecute the guilty, its findings raised awareness that acts of genocide were potentially
committed in Guatemala under Ríos Montt.
Nunca Más, written by Bishop Gerardi and released on April 24, 1998, represents an
attempt to surpass the limitations imposed upon the Commission.127 A project by Guatemalans
for Guatemalans to understand their history and clarify how to proceed into the future with the
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painful memories of the past. However, just two days after the report’s release, Bishop Gerardi
was assassinated.128 Moreover, because the Guatemalan government at first seemed apathetic in
pursuing a criminal investigation of the assassination, it appears to have been politically
motivated.129
Both the Truth Commissions’ findings and Nunca Más, helped pave the path for justice.
At first lawyers were not confident the crimes could be defined as genocide. They would need to
demonstrate that the Guatemalan state intended to kill Mayans as Mayans, not because
indigenous communities were organizing against the state.130 They needed to explain how the
army redefined indigenous populations as the enemy. They needed to address how entire
communities and areas were defined as bad, and what it has to do with racism in Guatemala.131
In 1999, the Spanish National Court began to build the official case against Ríos Montt.132 Due
to the “Pinochet Effect” mentioned above, other cases were being filed against former Latin
American dictators by the Spanish National Court. The Court struggled to build the case because
the Supreme Court only recognized cases that showed a close tie to Spain; however, finally in
2005, the Constitutional Court reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, saying Spain observes
“universal jurisdiction” for certain crimes of international importance prosecutable in any
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jurisdiction as prescribed by international treaties.133 The CJA joined the case in 2006. They
brought 40 individual witnesses to testify in Spain, including Rigoberta Menchú.
In July 2006, the Spanish court Juzgado Central de Instrución No 1, Audiencia Nacional,
Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, issued international arrest warrants for seven former military
officials, including Ríos Montt, for genocide, terrorism, torture, assassination, and illegal
detention.134 Despite the arrest warrant, Ríos Montt fought his extradition to Spain through
appeals in local Guatemalan courts.
The amount of support and evidence against Ríos Montt has only accumulated since the
CEH. Support includes hundreds of testimonies used in the trial against Ríos Montt, such as one
with Juana Sanchez Toma. She said, “they raped us in groups repeatedly. A mountain of women,
so many women. They raped us all but none of us women said anything because we were
terrified. The pain never ended. I began to hemorrhage from all the rapes.” 135 Death Squads such
as Mano Blanca, Ojo por Ojo, and NOA were all military units, who aimed to eliminate allies of
“subversion.” My Aunt Alma was best friends with the wives of some of the Mano Blanca
members; their names were Liselotte Lemmherhofer, Alicia Rivera, Regina Lainfiesta and Rosa
Barillas. She recalls,
These were very wealthy and influential people. They used to get together and
make plans. I Know that Liselotte’s husband was the one who kidnapped the
German Ambassador. Liselotte told me that her husband took her kids out to the
zoo while having the ambassador in the trunk of his car. She also said that they
did not want to kill him, only kidnap him in exchange for money, but they did not
count on his heart condition and he died.” My aunt continues, “The members of
the Mano Blanca were involved in the torture of civilians to find the rebel who
133
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murdered the US Ambassador, [John Gordon Mein] in 1968. As far as I know, he
was caught.136
The military and secret police murdered, tortured, and raped women and children, clearly
noncombatants and in no way “in support” of insurgency groups. Children were even kidnapped
by the army. My Aunt Alma also remembers witnessing the Guatemalan army kidnap young
soldiers,
I remember one time [my family and I] went to a far village beyond Solola
[a city slightly west of Guatemala City], and saw a military truck with lots
of soldiers grabbing every child over the age of 12 or 13. They were
practically kidnapping them to join the military. They were very mean and
forceful. My father was very sad and I did not understand why until
now.137
In an interview with Sanford, she explains that under Ríos Montt there was a systematic
change in the massacres: they shifted from selective to massive, destroying entire villages and
their crops in repeatedly organized massacres.138 In an interview with Pamela Yates for her
documentary Where the Mountains Trembled, she captured live footage of the Maya
communities and the aftermath of these systematic massacres. She also captured Ríos Montt
giving verbal confirmation that he commanded his army during his entire presidency. Ríos Montt
said, “our strength is in our capacity to make command decisions. That’s the most important
thing. The army is ready and able to act, because if I can’t control the Army, then what am I
doing here?”139 This interview became the centerpiece for her documentary, Granito: How to
Catch a Dictator, and was used in court against Ríos Montt.
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Ríos Montt still denies he committed any human rights violations, and is still backed by
his few standing supporters. His daughter claims there was not a genocide in Guatemala. She
even said that the testimony witnesses are not credible; they invented stories taught to them by
the guerrilla groups in exchange for compensation. But scientists who have investigated the
deaths in the villages provide physical evidence using the bone remains that match the testimony
stories. Moreover, they are able to identity the DNA for the survivors and help piece together the
details of their stories. Still, his supporters insist that the scientists are wrong, such as his former
advisor, Harris Whitbeck, who asked, “how can they prove who shot the bullet? Do they know
exactly how they were killed?” But the evidence is stacked highly against Ríos Montt using both
testimonies and scientific data to support their claims. Moreover, Patrick Ball, a statistician who
compared homicide rates in Guatemala, said about 5.5 percent of the Indigenous people alive
died during his presidency.140 The case also includes data from the US satellite Landsat, which
shows that huge areas of land that were highly vegetated in 1979 were completely bare in 1986;
the aftermath of Ríos Montt’s fire scorching policy.
Through the piling evidence presented in the trial against Ríos Montt, it is evident that
these were more than acts of war, they were systematically planned human rights violations, all
of which have been documented by the secret Guatemalan Intelligence and survivor testimonies,
then further supported by scientists, anthropologists and other professionals and their
investigations. It is clear that Ríos Montt committed horrific human rights crimes.
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Definition of Genocide
Coined by Raphaël Lemkin in 1944, genocide is defined as an effort to destroy the
“essential foundations of the life of national groups” whose objectives “would be disintegration
of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion and the
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such group” in whole or in
part.141 It is important to address that genocide is an extremely complex series of events, which
requires various perspectives and must be examined from multi-causal patterns.
In the twentieth century alone, 65,000 Hereros, 1 million Armenians, 6 million
Ukrainians, 6 million Jews, 3 million Bangladeshis, almost 1 million Indonesians, 100,000
Hutus, 2 million Cambodians, 200,000 East Timorese, 200,000 Guatemalans and countless
numbers of indigenous peoples have been annihilated.142 So many people have died in these
crimes against humanity, yet why have they not been stopped? This question motivated Lemkin
to coin the term genocide, a hybrid word taken from the Greek genos (race, tribe) and the Latin
cide (killing), in order to prosecute the mass murderers after firsthand observing the catastrophes
of the Nazi Holocaust.143 Two years later, the Genocide Convention of 1948 established the rules
that defined the difference between acts of genocide and other human rights violations. The
United Nations General Assembly says genocide occurs when one or a combination of prohibited
acts occurs with the intent to destroy such groups. When an individual is targeted because of his
or her membership in one of these groups, the crime committed can be construed as a “step in the
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overall objective of destroying the group.”144 Individual Mayans were targeted for being
associated with their Mayan communities under the premise that all Mayans are part of the
internal enemy because they support the guerrilla. 145 Under the UNGA, genocide has been
prohibited internationally to prevent groups from extermination or attempted extermination;
these groups should be protected.
The legal definition of genocide was written right after World War II during a highly
politicized atmosphere, leaving the destruction of political groups written out for the
convention.”146 However, according to Chalk and Jonassohn, genocide is defined as “a form of
one-sided mass killings in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group as that
group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”147 Their definition is useful because
it allows the inclusion of victim groups that fall outside the UN’s definition, such as groups
targeted because of their political opposition to a regime or due to their class or social status. In
addition, their definition focuses on the physical extermination of a group, while recognizing the
crime of ethnocide.148 The killings that occurred throughout the highlands were executed by the
military; these massacres can be interpreted as one-sided programs designed to destroy the
foundation of the “communist insurgency.”149 Moreover, the absence of democratic institutions
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and simultaneous concentration of power in one group is a frequented structural condition for
genocide.150
The case has come to be viewed as genocide following the results of the Commission for
Historical Clarification. The divisions in Guatemalan society at the root of its civil war were
based in subordination of Mayas and the poor.151 The CEH and case against Ríos Montt has
come to the conclusion that he committed acts of genocide, but can his intent to destroy the
Mayas be proved in the court of law? Also, the case has taken so long to prove because there is
so much research and investigation that goes into a crime of such magnitude. In the case of the
Guatemala genocide, it took years to gain global attention. Then it took hundreds of testimonies,
forensic analysis of the remains, the CEH’s findings, classified documents that resurfaced over
the years, dozens of lawyers to put the information together, and the support of Guatemala, who
lived in denial for a long time, to finally make a case for genocide. This amount of work takes
time, and fabricates a series of complicated theories of Ríos Montt’s intent and goals versus his
crimes and their aftermath.

Were Ríos Montt’s Crimes Acts of Genocide?
Some theorize that state terror was solely used to eliminate guerrilla activity, and that the
Mayan people lived in the departments with the most intense guerrilla activity. However, the
government's terror waves have been linked both to guerrilla successes and have also occurred in
the absence of it.152 Moreover, as discussed in previous sections, the Guatemalan army attacked
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thousands of non-combatants. Another explanation for state terror in Guatemala is that it results
from “institutionalization, consolidation, and the crisis of a counterinsurgent model,” proposing
that the program of genocide in Guatemala results because the state and government are weak
and incapable of confronting social contradictions by any other means besides terror.153 The
disadvantage of this explanation is that it does not explain the sources of weakness; the argument
is circular saying, terror exists because there is an unavoidable need to use terror.154
By examining the historical and structural roots of violence, one can see that state terror
in Guatemala has continued and grown from a cycle of unstable governments whose policies
continued to promote the discrimination of Mayans. After centuries of discrimination and lack of
basic human rights, a civil society emerged in the 1960s (the guerilla groups) who refused to
accept their policies. The army responded with brutal violence that continued to escalate on both
sides until Ríos Montt’s presidency, in which he utilized his scorched earth policy and “beans
and rifle” campaign to eliminate anyone who posed a threat to his government. By nature, this
meant any and all Mayan groups. Rothenberg wrote in his 2012 examination of the CEH’s
Memory of Silence, “The elimination of leaders and criminal acts against minors cannot be
understood to serve a military objective, demonstrating that the only common factor among all
victims was their membership in an ethnic group.”155 The massacres revealed to the CEH that
intelligence services planned them, meaning the Mayan people were targeted for simply
belonging to a group identified as an internal “enemy.”156 These inhumane acts were carried out

153

Huggins, Vigilantism, 77.

154

Huggins, Vigilantism, 78.

155

Rothenberg, 76.

156

Rothenberg, 47.

44

with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Maya groups, as stated in Article II, first
paragraph, of the Geneva Convention.157
Ríos Montt dehumanized the Mayan peoples. He increased the violence of an already
brutal counterinsurgency campaign and depopulated the area by burning entire villages and
causing large-scale forced relocations. He destroyed the very bases of communal structures. As
was openly acknowledged, the goal of the army was to literally “drain the sea” in which guerrilla
movement operated, eradicating any and all civilian support.158 Doing so, he killed thousands of
Mayans, destroyed their culture, and threatened to destroy their very identities. The destruction
of communities not only led to material devastation, but to the desecration of victims’ corpses,
the ban on burying relatives, and the impossibility of conducting burial ceremonies used by
Mayan communities to honor the life cycle. 159 His Civil Defense Patrols are an example of how
he worked to destroy Mayan culture because he saw it as a barrier to government victory. He
sought to turn the indigenous communities against each other.160 In a testimony by Victor
Montejo, a Jacaltecan Mayan and school teacher in the town of Huehuetenango in the early 80s,
Montejo says,
The military indoctrination was the last step in a process that had gradually
undermined the foundations of indigenous culture, causing the Indian to act
against his own will and best interests and destroying what is most sacred in his
ancient Mayan legacy: love and respect for one’s neighbors.161
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The Guatemalan army organized an attack on the cultural, spiritual, and religious elements of life
for the Mayan people.
Ríos Montt also used several forms of terror for his counterinsurgency strategy. Forced
disappearances were a prevalent element of the counterinsurgency strategy. The CEH
documented that eighty percent of the disappearances were responsible by the Guatemalan army,
military commissioners, the Guardia de Hacienda (Treasury Police), the Policia Nacional, and
death squads, twelve percent were at the hands of the PAC, and eight percent by other security
forces, mainly the National Police. 162 These disappearances created an atmosphere of
apprehension and uncertainty for their families, political parties, and other organizations.
Other strategies of terror include forced displacement, rape and torture. Approximately
11,598 victims were tortured during the war, and eighty-eight percent of reported cases were
carried out by the Guatemala Army. Tortures reached their highest under Ríos Montt’s Victoria
82 plan. Rape was committed in a methodical and widespread manner. The CEH registered 9,411
female victims and 1,465 cases of rape. Eighty-nine percent of identified victims of rape were
Mayan. And forced displacement, in which 500,000 to 1.5 million Guatemalans were forced to
flee as a direct consequence of repression, was especially high during the 1980s.163 Selective
repression led to mass displacement beginning in 1981 when the repression became
indiscriminate. Soldiers who could not find who they were looking for would kill their targets’
relatives no matter their age or situation.164
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Guatemala is a plural society, divided into two hierarchically arranged ethno-cultural
groupings (Indian and ladino).165 And if one looks at Guatemala’s population, the East-West
divide illustrates that mostly Maya population is in the West and the Ladino population is in the
East. The West is considered the Indian domain, a land where the Maya still practice their ancient
ways and speak their own indigenous languages. Although these regions are more diverse in
reality, these regional and ethnic constructions add to the reaffirmation of racism during the civil
war, “as the Maya West was targeted for genocide and the supposed superiority of the Ladino
East was used to support that genocide.”166 Even now, Ladinos tend to resonate with their
Hispanic heritage, separating themselves from Guatemala’s large Maya population. During the
war, the indigenous people were seen as second-class citizens, and sadly much of Guatemalan
society felt indifferent about the war. An example of indifference is a story my Aunt Alma told
me. She said,
I was living in San Cristobal, a suburb by Tia Ligia’s home. It was, at the time,
very new, and very hard to get to if you did not have a car. Hector [her son] was 2
or 3 years old. One morning I went for a walk with him in his stroller. I saw a lot
of commotion, few policemen, some patrols and when I got closer I saw 2 human
heads by the curve. I now look back and can feel the indifference, I just thought
‘poor people’ and continued to walk. They were later identified as two
estudiantes de la Universidad de San Carlos that had disappeared after the parade
the day before that protested for better waged and working conditions. 167
When I asked my Aunt Alma if she ever felt in danger, she answered, “Never,”168 yet she
experienced terrorist bombings, and lost friends and family members to the war. My mom’s also
felt indifferent to the war. She said,
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Nothing in my life stopped. I was going to school as usual. I did not understand a
lot [about the war] at the time. I knew that there was a lot of violence. I knew of
kidnappings and people were disappearing, and university professors and writers
were being prosecuted... The first time I heard about violence in the Mayan
villages was from a Catholic Priest. I was in a bar and he was there, drunk and
crying. He told me a lot of horrible stories. Now I know that terrible things
happened.169
Racism may not have been the only reason behind the massacre, but the genocide of the Maya
was no mere coincidence. This underlying discrimination seems to have been an expression of
hundreds of years of suppression of the Maya people, and may be why it was so easy for
Guatemalans to deny these crimes, and for the government to justify their actions. My Aunt
Alma said,
I used to see the indigenas as beneath me. The maids were treated like third-class
citizens. We are all guilty of discrimination. I am ashamed of how I acted when I
was young, but to my defense I did not know better. We were indifferent to their
suffering and never once defended [the indigenous people]. They were ignored by
society.170
Even today, many people of Guatemala remain prejudice against the Mayan people. In each
interview I conducted, the interviewees affirmed today’s racism in Guatemala with their own
examples and stories. For example, my mom explained the term indio is used as a derogatory
word to insult indigenous people.171
The topic of genocide and human rights violations is still a sensitive subject for
Guatemalans. Most citizens truly had no idea of the horrors occurring in the highlands. Ríos
Montt and his administration did everything in their power to hide the proportion of violence;
however, the city civilians chose to act indifferent. They ignored the war going on around them
169

Rosamaria Pereira-Moscoso.

170 Alma
171

Hawley-Moscoso.

Rosamaria Pereira-Moscoso.

48

and went on with their lives. In fact, every person interviewed did not even consider the violence
a “war” while it was happening; it was the normalities of living in Guatemala. My mom even
said, “The world says that it was a Civil War, but I did not feel like it was. To me, it was just the
government trying to get rid of the guerillas.”172 Even current governments have postponed
taking political action because they have been in denial. President Alvaro Arzú chose not to
receive the the CEH’s report, Memory of Silence, when it was first released. It took the
government four months to respond.173 Furthermore, the CEH concluded that the state of
Guatemala violated Articles IV and VI of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, which requires that those persons who have committed genocide should
be tried by a competent court of the state.174
The height of genocidal activity “was concentrated in the departments of Huehuetenango,
El Quiche, Baja Verapaz, and Chimaltenango regions that have large concentrations of Maya.”175
If one examines the four main regions the violence took place, one would find that the violence
overwhelmingly impacted the Mayan people. In region one (municipalities of San Juan Cotzal,
Santa María Nebaj, and San Gaspar Chajul, Quiché), where Maya Ixil People reside, all Ixil
people were considered subversive. There was no attempt to extinguish between members, so the
Ixil became targets as a result of their own identity, even if the motivation was military nature.176
The CEH determined that the combination of brutal, inhumane actions against the Maya Ixil
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population from 1980 to 1983 constituted acts of genocide. In region two (municipality of
Rabinal, Baja Verapaz), where the Maya Achí people reside, military groups assassinated at least
4,111 people (twenty percent of the population) between 1981 and 1983, even though this region
was not a combat zone. The CEH determined that during the years of 1980-1983 acts of genocide
were committed. In region three (municipality of Zacualpa, K’iché), where the Maya K’iche’
people reside, over ninety-nine percent of the victims in the area were Maya, and less than one
percent were Ladino. The CEH found that the Ladino population was actually warned to flee
before the massacres began. 177 The CEH found that the crimes committed in this region from
1981-1983 were acts of genocide. And in region four (municipalities of Nentón, San Mateo
Ixtatán, and Barrillas, Huehuetenango), where the Chuj Maya and Q’anjob’al Maya peoples
reside, the CEH recorded that most communities suffered forced displacement. And when
examining these four regions together, the CEH founded that “in the Ixil area, 98 percent of the
victims were Maya. In the northern Huehuetenango, the proportion of Maya victims was 99
percent, while in Rabinal it was nearly 100 percent, and in Zacualpa 98 percent.”178 It is clear
that the Mayan people were the Guatemalan army’s primary targets.
At an international conference in Rome on July 17, 1998, the Statue of the International
Criminal Court outlined several objective elements to the definition of genocide, including that
the motive to destroy a group of people does not have to be pure racism, but can also be part of a
military objective.179 To prove that the acts were genocide, the CEH used the legal framework of
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the Genocide Convention of 1950, analysis of the general policies of the state, and understanding
of the context of which the acts were committed.180
To this day, Ríos Montt says he is innocent, and never personally ordered the
extermination, yet as we have examined, he admitted to having complete control of the army in
an interview with Pamela Yates. Ríos Montt did in fact order the Guatemalan army to attack noncombatants. His obsession with religious and military power fueled his desperation to rid the
internal enemy, the Mayan people. These acts required coordination of the military system at a
national level, meaning these were not isolated acts or out-of-control army troops. In
Goldhagen’s documentary, he confronts Ríos Montt about the genocide at one of his trials. Ríos
Montt said, “the UN laws and international codes have a concept of genocide... When you’re
going to eliminate an ethnic group, a religious group, or a specific group of people, the definition
clearly states eliminating something.” Goldhagen corrected him and said, “the UN law says “in
whole or in part, which the Mayan people were.” Ríos Montt only responds, “if I was responsible
of it I would be in jail.”181
Conclusion
During the entire 30-year conflict, the Center for Legal Action in Human Rights
(CALDH), a Washington D.C based organization that promotes human rights in Guatemala,
found that 200,000 people died, 45,000 were missing, and a million were displaced.182 Just to
reiterate, although Mayas make up a little over half of the Guatemalan population, they
accounted for over 80 percent of the war’s dead and disappeared, and estimated 93 percent of
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them were killed at the hands of the state. 183 Ríos Montt was finally founded guilty by a threejudge panel in for these crimes May of 2013; however, there were setbacks of a prolonged trial
as discussed above.
It seems that in efforts to modernize, Guatemalan economy had a fragile position within
the world economic order. This only led to civil unrest, and eventually opposition to the
repressive government. Even now, after the Peace Accords of 1996, Guatemala suffers from
political corruption. Perhaps, Guatemala is in need of constructing a harmony between civil
society and state. Democracy will only come to Guatemala after social and economic issues have
been addressed and resolved. Until then the State will recourse to terror. 184 Guatemala still has a
lot to gain from this case and the awareness it has created concerning political corruption and its
affects on civil harmony.
Guatemala is not the only country in the past few decades to have human rights violations
occur without any consequences. This trial is an example to other countries who have failed to
hold individuals responsible for human rights violations. We can only hope that by addressing
such human rights violations, we can prevent more in the future. The genocide that Ríos Montt
carried out against the Mayan people was named the “Silent Holocaust” by the CJA because it
went unknown for years by Guatemala and the world; let us not allow another tragedy to take
place in silence.

183

CEH, Guatemala Memory of Silence.

184

Huggins, Vigilantism, 81.

52

Bibliography

Arias, Arturo, ed. (with a Response by David Stoll). The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.
“Around the World; U.S. Clears Military Vehicles for Export to Guatemala.” NY Times. 19 June
1981. nytimes.com/1981/06/19/world/around-the-world-us-clears-militaryvehicles-for-export-to-guatemala.html. Accessed 10 March 2014.
Booth, John A. and Thomas W. Walker. Understanding Central America. Boulder: Westview,
1989.
Brunberg, Jon. “Guatemalan Civil War.” The Polynational War Memorial. August 15, 2013.
www.war-memorial.net/Guatemalan-Civil-War-3.205. Accessed 15 March 2014.
Campbell, Kenneth J. Genocide and the Global Village. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Central Intelligence Agency. “Counterinsurgency Operations in El Quiché.” February 1982.
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc20.pdf. Accessed 10
November 2013.
______. “Ríos

Montt Gives Blanche to Archivos to Deal with Insurgency.” Feburary 1982.

www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc23.pdf. Accessed 10 Nov
2013.
Charny, Israel W. ed. Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review. London: Mansell Publishing
Limited, 1988.
Commission for Historical Clarification. Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the
Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations. N.d.

53

www.hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf. Accessed 15
November 2013.
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. “Caso Masacre Plan de Sánchez Vs. Guatemala.”
19 November 2004. www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_116_esp.pdf.
Accessed 16 March 2014.
Cullather, Nicholas. “Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954.”
Washington D.C: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.
Curley, Celeste. Telephone interview by Ana Pereira. 6 March 2014.
Department of Defense. “Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report.” 2 April 1974.
www.2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB419/docs/Efrain%20Rios%20Montt%
20-%20Bio%20DOD%202%20Apr%2074.pdf. Accessed 4 February 2014.
______. “00794: Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center.” 7 April 1982.
www2gwu.edu~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB425/docs/1-820407%20DIA %20
Views%20of%20a%20Coup%20Leader.pdf. Accessed 10 March 2014.
Department of State. “Human Rights in Guatemala.” 4 August 1982. www.2.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB419/docs/V.11.%20U.S.%20Department%20of%
20State,%20Secret%20INR%20Report,%20Human%20Rights%20in%20
Guatemala,%20August%204,1982.pdf. Accessed 4 February 2014.
______. “Recent Kidnappings: Signs Point to Government Security Forces.” 2 February 1984.
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc29.pdf. Accessed November
2013.

54

Director of Intelligence. “Guatemala: Prospects for Political Moderation.” August 1983.
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/docs/doc26.pdf. Accessed 15 March
2014.
Doyle, Kate ed. “The Final Battle: Ríos Montt’s Counterinsurgency Campaign.” 9 May 2013.
The National Security Archive. www.2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB425/#_ftn3. Accessed March 2014.
Drouin, Marc. "To the Last Seed: Atrocity Crimes and the Genocidal Continuum in
Guatemala, 1978-1984." M.A Thesis, Concordia University (Canada), 2006.
"Fernando Romeo Lucas García." Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2014. http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/350502/Fernando-Romeo-Lucas-Garcia. 5
February 2014.
From Guatemalan Soil, Unearthing Evidence of Genocide. Narrated by Miles O’Brien. PBS
News Hour, 8 May 2013. www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOIJ1-7LDQs.
Genocide: Worse than War. Directed by Daniel Goldhagen. 2009. United States: PBS, 2010.
Grandin, Greg. “Slaughter was Part of Reagan’s Hard Line.” New York Times, 21 May 2013.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/19/what-guilt-does-the-us-bear-inguatemala/guatemalan-slaughter-was-part-of-reagans-hard-line.
Granito: How to Nail a Dictator. Directed by Pamela Yates, 2011. United States: Skylight
Pictures. PBS.
“Guatemala Ríos Montt Genocide Trial to Resume in 2015.” BBC News: Latin America &
Caribbean. 6 November 2013. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24833642.
Accessed 20 November 2013.

55

“Guatemala ‘Silent Holocaust’ The Mayan Genocide.” The Center for Justice and Accountability.
25 Oct 2013. CJA.Org.
Hawley-Moscoso, Alma. Telephone interview by Ana Pereira. 18 January 2014.
Hinton, Alexander Laban and Kevin Lewis O’Neill, eds. Genocide: Truth, Memory, and
Representation. London: Duke University Press, 2009.
Huggins, Martha K, ed. Vigilantism and the State in Modern latin America: Essays on
Extralegal Violence. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.
Konefal, Betsy. Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala, 1960-1990.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010.
MacLeod, Murdo J. Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720. Berkeley:
California University Press, 1973.
Malkin, Elisabeth. “Former Leader of Guatemala is Guilty of Genocide Against Mayan Group.”
New York Times, May 10, 2013. www.nytimes.com/
2013/05/11/world/americas/gen-efrain-rios-montt-of-guatemala-guilty-of-genocide.html,
Accessed Oct 2013.
Menchú, Rigoberta, and Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in
Guatemala. London: Verso, 1984.
Miller, Majorie. “Indians’ Culture Torn by Guatemalan Political Strife.” Los Angeles Times,
November 29, 1985. articles.latimes.com/1985-11-29/news/mn4954_1_indian-women.
Accessed 5 Dec 2013.
Modifica Parcialmente el Estatuto de Gobierno. “Decreto Ley 24-82.” 23 April 1982.
www.2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB419/docs/Estatuto

56

%20Fundamental%20de%20Gobierno%20Decreto%20Ley%2024-82,%2027.4.82.pdf.
Accessed 5 February 2014.
O’Brien, Tim. The Things They Carried. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1990.
Oglesby, Elizabeth, and Amy Ross. “Guatemala's Genocide Determination and the Spatial
Politics of Justice.” Space and Polity 13, no. 1 (2009): 21-39.
Parry, Robert. “Ronald Reagan: Accessory to Genocide - Ex-Guatemalan Dictator Ríos Montt
Guilty of Mayan Genocide.” Global Research, May 11, 2013.
Pereira-Moscoso, Rosamaria. Personal interview by Ana Pereira, Loomis, CA, 28 November
2013.
Perera, Victor. Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy. Berkeley: University of
California, 1993.
“The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights.” Choice Reviews
Online 43, no. 3 (2005): 43.
Reagan, Ronald. "Remarks in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, Following a Meeting With President
Jose Efrain Rios Montt of Guatemala." December 4, 1982. The American Presidency
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42069. Accessed January 2014.
Reynolds, Louisa. “Dos Erres Unearthed Again.” Latin America Press, 3 February 2011.
www.lapress.org/articles.asp?art=6301. Accessed January 2014.
Rothenberg, Daniel, ed. Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Salazar, Ega Martínez. Global Coloniality of Power in Guatemala. Lanham Maryland:
Lexington Books, 2012.

57

Sandoval-Moscoso, Ligia. Telephone interview by Ana Pereira, 21 February 2014.
Sanford, Victoria. "Guatemala Genocide." Interview by CUNY Media. YouTube. CUNY Media,
11 Aug. 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=TJFwkKQWglw&list=PLXhuzKSXJ9OSv50WcdLtMKt8e8SIpuRlI. Accessed 16
October 2013.
Sandoval-Moscoso, Ligia. Telephone interview by Ana Pereira, 21 February 2014.
Sanford, Victoria. Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Sautter, Robert P. “The Preconditions for Genocide: Guatemala and Bolivia Compared.” M.S.
Thesis San Francisco State University. Department of Social Science: Interdisciplinary
Studies, 1999.
Totten, Samuel and William S. Parsons, eds. Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and
Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Routledge Falmer, 2009.
“The Trial of Efraín Ríos Montt & Mauricio Rodriguez Sanchez.” A Project of the Open Society
Justice Initiative. November 11, 2013. www.riosmontt-trial.org.
United Nations General Assembly, Paris, France, 9 December 1948. Convention on the
	


Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Paris.

Wills, Santiago. “Did Reagan Finance Genocide in Guatemala?” Hulton Archive. 25 October
2013. fusion.net//abc_univision/news/story/ronald-reagan-finance-genocideguatemala-22537.
Woodward, Ralph Lee. Central America, a Nation Divided. New York: Oxford University Press,
1985.

